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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOSEPH W. O'KEEFE, JR., : 
Appellant, : 
v. : Case No. 95-0742 
Priority No. 14 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, : 
Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (1953, as amended) and 
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEM'S INTERPRETATION OF THE 
STATUTORY TERM "OVERTIME" WAS REASONABLE. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act allows this Court 
to grant relief where the agency has erroneously interpreted 
or applied the law. §63-46b-16(4)(d) Utah Code Ann. 
In reviewing an application or interpretation of law, the 
appellate court is to use a correction of error standard 
giving no deference to the hearing officer's conclusion. 
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(Utah 1992) 
Discretion is granted to the agency's application of the 
law only when there is a grant of discretion to the agency, 
express or implied, by the statute itself. Stokes v. Board of 
Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Ut. App. 1992) 
This issue has been preserved on appeal because appellant 
raised the issue in his memorandum submitted to the Hearing 
Officer following the submission of stipulated facts. 
II. THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT APPELLANT WAS AWARE THAT THE UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEM HAD 
ONLY CONDITIONALLY AGREED TO RESUME ITS ACCEPTANCE OF "GAP 
TIME" CONTRIBUTIONS. 
An agency's findings of fact are accorded substantial 
deference, but may be overturned if not based on substantial 
evidence or against the clear weight of the evidence. Harley 
v. Industrial Commission, 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988), Cal 
Wadsworth Const, v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372 
(Utah 1995) 
This issue has been preserved on appeal because appellant 
raised the issue in his memorandum submitted to the Hearing 
Officer following the submission of stipulated facts. 
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III. THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN 
CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF 
FOR APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. 
This is the same standard of review as stated in Point I. 
This issue has been preserved on appeal because appellant 
raised the issue in his memorandum submitted to the Hearing 
Officer following the submission of stipulated facts. 
IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN 
CONCLUDING THAT THE RETIREMENT SYSTEM'S INTERPRETATION OF 
OVERTIME HAS NOT INTERFERED WITH AN EXISTING EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT AND RESTRICTED THE MEMBERS' RIGHT TO CONTRACT FOR 
THEIR LABOR. 
This is the same standard of review as stated in Point I. 
This issue has been preserved on appeal because appellant 
raised the issue in his memorandum submitted to the Hearing 
Officer following the submission of stipulated facts. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
§49-1-102, Utah Code Ann. 
(1) The purpose of this Chapter is to establish a 
central administrative office and a board to 
administer the various retirement systems 
established by the Legislature. 
(2) This title shall be liberally construed to 
provide maximum benefits and protections. 
§49-4a-103(l) thru (3), Utah Code Ann. 
As used in this chapter: 
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(1) (a) "Compensation", "salary", or "wages" means the 
total amount of payments which are currently 
includable in gross income made by an employer to an 
employee for services rendered to the employer as 
base income for the position covered under the 
retirement system. Base income shall be determined 
prior to any salary deductions or reductions for any 
salary deferral or pre-tax benefit programs 
authorized by federal law. 
(b) "Compensation" includes performance-based 
bonuses and cost-of-living adjustments. 
(c) "Compensation" does not include: 
(i) overtime; 
(ii) sick pay incentives; 
(iii) retirement pay incentives; 
(iv) the monetary value of remuneration paid in 
kind, as in a residence, use of equipment 
or uniform or travel allowances; 
(v) lump-sum payment or special payment 
covering accumulated leave; and 
(vi) all contributions made by an employer 
under this plan or under any other 
employee benefit plan maintained by an 
employer for the benefit of a participant. 
(d) "Compensation" for purposes of this chapter may 
not exceed the amount allowed under Internal Revenue 
Code Section 401(a)(17). 
(2) "Final average salary" means the amount computed by 
averaging the highest three years of annual compensation 
preceding retirement subject to Subsections (a) and (b) . 
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), the 
percentage increase in annual compensation in any one 
of the years used may not exceed the previous year's 
salary by more than 10% plus a cost-of-living 
adjustment equal to the decrease in the purchasing 
power of the dollar during the previous year, as 
measured by the Consumer Price Index prepared by 
the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(b) In cases where the employing unit provides 
acceptable documentation to the board, the limitation 
in Subsection (a) may be exceeded if: 
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(i) the member has transferred form another 
employing unit; 
(ii) the member has been promoted to a new 
position; or 
(iii) the years used are not consecutive. 
(3) "Full-time service" means 2,080 hours a year. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is a Petition for Review of an Adjudicative Hearing 
Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relative to 
a decision of the Utah State Retirement System adverse to 
appellant, Joseph W. O'Keefe, Jr., hereinafter O'Keefe. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
On July 12, 1994, the Utah Retirement System notified 
O'Keefe, that the Retirement Board would not accept 
contributions for "GAP time" work of Ogden City police 
officers. O'Keefe filed a Request for Board Action appealing 
that decision. 
A hearing was conducted on May 31, 1995, before 
James L. Barker, Adjudicative Hearing Officer. The parties 
entered into a written Stipulation of Facts which were 
submitted to the hearing officer. After Memorandums were 
filed, the hearing officer issued his decision on 
October 12, 1995, finding for the Retirement Board. O'Keefe 
then timely filed this Petition for Review. 
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III. DISPOSITION AT AGENCY LEVEL. 
The Adjudicative Hearing Officer issued Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law concluding that the Retirement Board 
had correctly interpreted the statutory term of "overtime" and 
that "GAP time" would not be eligible for retirement 
contributions. O'Keefe's Request for Board Action was 
dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 12, 1994, the Utah Retirement System notified 
O'Keefe, through his counsel, that any hours over 40 per week 
would be considered overtime and ineligible for retirement 
compensation benefits. O'Keefe filed a Request for Board 
Action and the matter was assigned to an Adjudicative Hearing 
Officer for determination. 
At the hearing, the parties entered into a written 
Stipulation of Facts. That Stipulation was: 
1. Petitioner Joe O'Keefe and other peace officers 
similarly situated are public safety employees employed 
by Ogden City and have been for the entire period of this 
controversy. 
2. On July 1, 1985, Ogden City initiated a program 
whereby its peace officers, under certain prescribed and 
agreed upon circumstances, could be required to work more 
than 40 hours per week. 
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3. In 1989, as a result of negotiations held between 
Ogden City and its employeesf including Petitioner, an 
agreement was reached whereby any hours worked in excess 
of 40 hours per week but not more than 43 hours per week 
could be treated in either of two ways: 
a) The three (3) hours in question (commonly referred to 
as "GAP" time) could be taken later as leave, 
pursuant to which no compensation would be paid; or 
b) The "GAP" time could be treated as regular 
compensation (paid at regular - not overtime rates), 
pursuant to which the officer would receive 
additional compensation on which retirement 
contributions would be paid. 
4. The effect of the additional compensation and 
retirement contribution in the final three (3) years of 
Petitioner's employment would result in an increase in 
the monthly retirement allowance of Petitioner 
estimated as follows: 
A. Assuming a May 1, 1995 retirement date: 
If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the 
additional compensation is used in the calculation of 
the retirement allowance, the benefit would be 
$1,819.68. 
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time 
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and the additional compensation is not used in the 
calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit 
would be $1,697.34. 
B. Assuming a July 1, 1995 retirement date: 
If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the 
additional compensation is used in the calculation of 
the retirement allowance, the benefit would be 
$1,842.48. 
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time 
and the additional compensation is not used in the 
calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit 
would be $1,717.80. 
Thus, Petitioner's retirement allowance, if GAP time is 
determined to be eligible time worked under Utah laws, 
would increase anywhere between $122.34 - $124.68 per 
month. 
5. In 1990, Ogden City began sending the first employer 
and employee contributions to the retirement systems for 
those employees who chose to treat the 3 hour additional 
time (GAP) worked as "regular compensation". URS 
received and credited these contributions to the 
appropriate participating members' accounts, including 
Petitioner. 
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6. In 1991 , due to an administrative oversight, no 
contributions were sent by Ogden City. In 1992, Ogden 
City forwarded the required contributions for both 1991 
and 1992. 
7. Upon receipt of the 1992 contributions, URS 
determined that the GAP time contributions were 
ineligible and refunded the GAP time contributions to 
Ogden City for the appropriate years. 
8. During the period from 1992 to the present, 
Petitioner has taken the position that both the original 
1990 contribution and subsequent contributions were 
eligible and should not have been refunded. URS has 
taken the position that the office ruled the 
contributions ineligible as soon as it had actual 
knowledge of the GAP time issues. Actual knowledge did 
not occur until sometime in 1992 when an employee sought 
to retire with GAP time included as part of compensation. 
9. During this same period, officials from URS, Ogden 
City, Petitioner, and others similarly situated met in an 
attempt to resolve the different interpretations of the 
law. During these discussions the retirement office 
agreed to resume its acceptance of GAP time contributions 
conditionally while an additional study took place on the 
feasibility of developing a permanent policy covering 
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GAP time contributions. Petitioner believed a permanent 
policy had been adopted and the contributions were being 
accepted unconditionally. 
10. Also during this time another employing unit, Weber 
County, requested GAP time coverage. All the parties 
then agreed that the board's actuary, Wyatt and 
Associates, should determine any actuarial impact which 
would result from including GAP time in "compensation" 
for retirement purposes. 
11. The actuary's assumptions and response was delivered 
in a letter to M. Dee Williams, Executive Director of 
URS, on June 2, 1994: 
"As explained to us, Ogden police officers have a 43-
hour work week. However, officers are allowed a choice 
between (i) taking direct pay for the 3 hours over the 
40, or (ii) taking this time as additional comp time. 
Most officers take the time as comp time, but as they 
approach retirement, officers can and do switch to 
taking this as pay. By doing so, they increase their 
Average Annual Compensation, resulting in a higher 
retirement benefit. 
This policy increases the employer's contribution rate 
from 9.8% to 11.7%. Our calculation assumes that all 
members elect to maximize their retirement benefit, i.e., 
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they will be able to plan well enough in advance to 
increase their retirement benefits by 7.5% (the ratio of 
the 3 extra hours to the 40 hours they were being paid 
for earlier)." 
12. As a result of the actuary's findings and 
conclusions, URS resolved to permanently deny GAP time 
contributions. An additional reason for denial was 
forwarded - any administrative, i.e. URS decision to 
include GAP time would indeed be adding a benefit with a 
potential cost to all employers and employees, not just 
to Ogden City and its employees, should be decided by the 
Legislature, not URS. 
13. Petitioner has brought to URS' attention that a 
small number of Ogden Public Safety officers actually 
received a retirement allowance with GAP time included. 
The retirement office has agreed to honor those 
retirements. 
14. There are twenty-two (22) Ogden police officers left 
in this dispute. Ten (10) officers have elected to take 
their GAP time contribution refunds and are excluded from 
this dispute. 
The Administrative Hearing Officer requested the parties 
to file memorandums. They were submitted and on 
October 12, 1995, the AHO issued his decision. He concluded 
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that the Retirement Systems' interpretation of the term 
"overtime" was reasonable. He dismissed O'Keefe's action. 
This appeal was taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The AHO failed to use the standard methods for resolving 
disputes concerning the meaning of a statutory term. Had he 
done so, he would have concluded that the URS's interpretation 
of the term "overtime" was in error. He did not harmonize his 
conclusions with the legislature's intent in passing relative 
statutes. Rather, the AHO merely acquiesced to the URS's 
interpretation of the term. The URS's interpretation imparts 
an uncommon meaning to the term and results in an unreasonable 
interference in existing employment contracts. Moreover, the 
AHO was clearly erroneous in his finding that O'Keefe and 
other members similarly affected failed to carry their burden 
of proof in invoking the Doctrine of Estoppel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN 
CONCLUDING THAT THE UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEM'S 
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTORY TERM "OVERTIME" 
FOUND IN UTAH CODE ANN. §49-4-103(1)(c) WAS 
REASONABLE. 
The AHO concluded that "The Board's interpretation (of 
the term "overtime") was not unreasonable". 
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A correction of error standard should be used when an 
appellate court reviews an agency's interpretation of the law. 
Anderson, supra. 
An agency's statutory construction should only be given 
deference when there is a grant of discretion to the agency 
concerning the language in questionf either expressly made in 
the statute or implied from the statutory language. Morton 
Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the State of Utah Tax Common, 
814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). An express statutory grant of 
discretion occurs when the legislature directs the agency to 
interpret a given statutory term by rule. Employer's 
Reinsurance Fund v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 856 P.2d 648 
650 (Utah App. 1993); Chevron v. State Tax Comm'n, 847 P.2d 
418, 419 (Utah App. 1993). 
There is no statutory provision which grants the URS the 
authority or direction to interpret the term "overtime." The 
AHO seems to suggest that since "full time service is defined 
as 2080 hours", anything in excess is overtime. O'Keefe has 
contended that the 2080 hours is only a minimum number of 
hours that an employee must work in order to be considered 
full time and therefore eligible for inclusion in the 
retirement system. It is not a term that imposes a maximum 
limitation on qualifying hours. 
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The AHO also appears to have based his decision in part 
on Utah Code Ann. §49-1-203 which requires the URS to maintain 
the system on an actuarial sound basis. He concludes that 
since GAP time would result in increased contribution rates 
for employers and employees, it would therefore cause some 
actuarial unsoundness in the plan. The AHO has failed to 
consider the explicit legislative intent stated in Utah Code 
Ann. §49-1-102(2) providing that the provisions of the Act 
should be liberally construed to provide maximum benefits. 
While he admits that the inclusion of "GAP time" contributions 
would result in substantial increased benefits for the 
members, he ignores that statutory mandate of Utah Code Ann. 
§49-1-102(2). The conclusion that the inclusion of "GAP time" 
contributions would somehow cause the URS to be maintained on 
an actuarial unsound basis has no factual basis. Nothing in 
the undisputed facts of this case supports this conclusion and 
it is illogical. 
This action is confined to approximately 22 officers of 
the Ogden Police Department who were or had been, at the time 
this action was initiated, participating in the established 
"GAP time" policy of that police department. 
The actuary's statement found in Fact 11 of the 
Stipulations applies only if all Ogden Police officers 
participate in the then existing process. Even then, it would 
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only necessitate a rate increase to the employer, not disrupt 
the soundness of the plan. 
Although the AHO acknowledged that the term overtime 
lacked statutory definition, he held that the URS's 
interpretation was reasonable rather than employing 
traditional rules of statutory construction. (Findings of 
Pact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to Dismiss, page 6 
para. 1.) 
In Morton, supra, the Court enunciated three rules for 
statutory interpretation if the term or phrase was in dispute: 
1. A statutory term should be interpreted and applied 
according to its usually accepted meaning, where the 
ordinary meaning of the term results in an application 
that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in 
blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the 
statute. At page 590. 
2. The rule of noscitur a sociis provides that the 
meaning of questionable words and phrases in a statute be 
ascertained by reference to the words or phrases 
associated with them. At page 590-591. 
3. The terms of a statute are to be interpreted as a 
comprehensive whole and not in piecemeal fashion. 
At page 591. 
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The application of any one of these rules would result in 
a determination favorable to O'Keefe. 
RULE 1. A statutory term should be interpreted 
and applied according to its usually 
accepted meaning, where the ordinary 
meaning of the term results in an 
application that is neither unreasonably 
confused, inoperable, nor in blatant 
contradiction of the express purpose of 
the statute. 
Utah Code Ann. §67-19-6.7(1) ( j )
 f Overtime policies for 
state employees, defines the term "overtime" as "actual time 
worked in excess of the employee's defined work period". 
Section l(n) provides that "work period" means: 
"(iii) for nonexempt law enforcement and 
hospital employees, the period established 
by each department by rule for those employees 
according to the requirements of the FLSA." 
Utah Code Ann. §67-19-6.7(2) provides that each 
department shall compensate each state employee who works 
overtime by complying with the requirements of this statute. 
Section (3) provides that: 
(a) each department shall negotiate and obtain a signed 
agreement from each nonexempt employee. 
(b) In the agreement, the nonexempt employee shall elect 
either to be compensated for overtime by: 
(i) taking time off work at the rate of one and one 
half hour off for each overtime hour worked; or 
(ii) being paid for the overtime worked at the rate of 
one and one half times the rate per hour that the 
state employee receives for nonovertime work. 
In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court held, that state and 
local governmental agencies must comply with the provisions of 
29 U.S.C. 201, The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Garcia v. 
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San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et al., 83 L Ed 2d 
1016, (1985). The FLSA was amended and permitted public 
agencies employing law enforcement personnel to define work 
periods that would result in 43 hour work weeks without paying 
overtime. 29 U.S.C. 207. 
The Board's interpretation of "overtime" as any hours 
worked in excess of 2080 per year, cannot be squared with the 
definition for other state employees found in Utah Code Ann. 
§67-19-6.7 or the definition of work period proscribed by the 
FLSA and applicable to cities. 
The AHO's conclusion with respect to the term "overtime" 
is therefore unreasonably confused or in blatant contradiction 
to the other statutory uses of that term for all other state 
employees. 
RULE 2. The rule of noscitur a sociis provides 
that the meaning of questionable words 
and phrases in a statute be ascertained 
by reference to the words or phrases 
associated with them. 
The Adjudicative Hearing Officer erred by ignoring other 
statutory terms associated with the term "overtime". 
Utah Code Ann. §49-4-103(1)(a) and (b) define what the 
legislature has determined to be "compensation" for the 
purposes of the Public Safety Retirement Act. Section (l)(c) 
defines what "compensation" is not. 
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Compensation is defined as "the total amount of payments 
. . . made by the employer to an employee . . . as base 
income." Compensation includes "bonuses and cost of living 
increases." It is not in any way tied to a specific number of 
hours. Section (l)(c) provides that compensation is not, (i) 
overtime, (ii) sick pay incentives, (iii) retirement pay 
incentives, (iv) the monetary value of renumeration paid in 
kind . . . , (v) a lump-sum payment or special payment . 
. . , (vi) all contributions made by an employer . . . . 
All terms associated with the term "overtime" are 
concerned with the payment of monetary sums, not hours worked. 
The statute clearly refers to "overtime compensation." This 
definition is a common interpretation of the term, it is in 
line with the federal interpretation of the term, and it 
complies specifically with the definition found in Utah Code 
Ann. §67-19-6.7(3)(ii) applicable to state employees. 
RULE 3. Interpretation of the term "overtime" 
should be in relationship to the 
comprehensive whole of the Statute. 
Utah Code Ann. §49-1-102(1) provides that the purpose of 
legislature in passing the Utah State Retirement Act was to 
establish a central administrative office and board to 
administer the various retirement systems established by the 
legislature. Section (2) provides that the provisions of the 
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Title "shall be liberally construed to provide maximum 
benefits. . ." (emphasis added). 
The AHO's conclusion that although the inclusion of 
contributions stemming from "GAP time" hours would provide 
members with a substantial benefit, the URS need not consider 
those contributions contradicts this express intention of the 
legislature. The whole of the Act is intended for the benefit 
of its members, that is, the public safety employees who will 
be the retirees of the future. There is no reason to apply 
such a restrictive meaning to the term "overtime". There is 
no reason not to provide the greatest benefit to the members. 
POINT II 
THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT APPELLANT WAS AWARE THAT THE UTAH RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM HAD ONLY CONDITIONALLY AGREED TO RESUME ITS 
ACCEPTANCE OF "GAP TIME" CONTRIBUTIONS. 
In his memorandum, submitted after the AHO received the 
stipulated facts, O'Keefe contended that URS's agreement to 
accept the GAP time contributions and his reliance thereon, 
equitably estopped the Board from later rejecting those 
contributions. 
In denying O'Keefe's claim of equitable estoppel, the AHO 
stated O'Keefe was aware the Board agreed to resume its 
acceptance of "GAP" time contributions only conditionally. 
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This conclusion is simply not supported by the Stipulation of 
Facts. That Stipulation specifically provides in paragraph 9: 
"During this same period, officials from URS, 
Ogden City, and others similarly situated met 
in an attempt to resolve the different 
interpretations of the law. During these 
discussions, the retirement office agreed to 
resume its acceptance conditionally while an 
additional study took place on the feasibility 
of developing a permanent policy covering GAP 
time contributions. Petitioner believed a 
permanent policy had been adopted and the 
contributions were being accepted 
unconditionally." (Emphasis added) 
These are the only facts presented relating to O'Keefe's 
knowledge as to the reason the URS started re-accepting 
contributions for GAP time. 
Even more confusing is the AHO's finding that O'Keefe's 
awareness of the conditional nature of the URS's reacceptance 
of "GAP time" contributions "while an additional study took 
place on the feasibility of developing a permanent policy" 
somehow equated to foreknowledge that the URS might in the 
future discontinue the acceptance of those contributions. 
If, however, as O'Keefe argues, the additional 
contributions were not prohibited but rather permitted by 
statute and the study was merely to determine whether the then 
current contribution rate was sufficient, then contributions 
rightly should have been accepted and any adjustments could 
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easily have been made at a later date to satisfy actuarial 
needs• 
The only evidence in this case are stipulated facts, and 
those facts clearly indicate that O'Keefe did not know of the 
conditional nature of the URS's acceptance of the 
contributions. Nor do the facts support the finding that an 
ongoing study being conducted by the URS was determinative of 
the continued acceptance of the contributions. Rather, the 
facts clearly show that O'Keefe believed the contributions 
were being accepted unconditionally. 
POINT III 
THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN 
CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO MEET 
HIS BURDEN OF PROOF FOR APPLYING THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. 
The elements essential to invoke equitable estoppel are: 
(1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable 
action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of 
the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to 
act: and (3) injury to the second party that would result from 
allowing the act, or failure to act. Eldridqe v. Utah 
Retirement System, 795 P.2d 671 (Ut. App. 1990). In Eldridqe. 
the Court said that while as a general rule, the doctrine of 
-21-
estoppel may not be asserted against the state and its 
agencies, there are some unusual cases where they cannot 
reasonably escape the doctrine. Utah courts have, in fact, 
carved out an exception to this general rule where it is plain 
that the interests of justice so require. Utah State Univ. v. 
Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982); See, e.g., 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 
689 (Utah 1979). 
The undisputed facts of this case are that URS agreed to 
accept all contributions that had previously been rejected and 
re-apply those contributions to the individual affected 
members' accounts and O'Keefe believed that a permanent "GAP 
time" policy had been embraced as a result. (Element number 
one) He contributed a percentage of his wages to the URS for 
over four years for his GAP time hours. (Element number two) 
Based upon a projected retirement benefit, O'Keefe made 
decisions concerning retirement. The decision of URS to 
subsequently reject the contributions has injured O'Keefe 
since his retirement pay is approximately $120 per month lower 
for the rest of his life. (Element number three) 
The elements of equitable estoppel have been met. The 
hearing officer's decision should be reversed. 
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POINT IV 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN 
CONCLUDING THAT THE RETIREMENT SYSTEM'S 
INTERPRETATION OF OVERTIME HAS NOT 
INTERFERED WITH AN EXISTING EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT AND RESTRICTED THE MEMBERS' RIGHT 
TO CONTRACT FOR THEIR LABOR. 
The Utah State Personnel Management Act (§67-19-1 et. 
seq., Utah Code Ann.) provides that it is the policy of the 
state "to ensure its employees opportunities for satisfying 
careers and fair treatment. . ." §67-19-2(6), Utah Code Ann. 
While this Act specifically applies to state employees, 
it requires (and permits) employees and departments to 
negotiate contracts regarding work periods and overtime 
compensation. §67-19-6.7, Utah Code Ann. 
The State of Utah has adopted statutory provisions 
defining and authorizing collective bargaining. §34-20-1, 
et. seq., Utah Code Ann. Employees of political subdivisions 
are authorized to self-organize and to bargain collectively 
for their mutual protection. §34-20-7, Utah Code Ann. 
Furthermore, cities are authorized to bind themselves to 
bargaining agreements provided they do not "contract beyond 
the scope of its power". 
Park City Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ, 879 P.2d 267 
(Ut. App. 1994) 
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Following the July 1, 1985 ruling of Garcia, Ogden City 
changed its work period policy for police officers to take 
advantage of the extra hours exemption created by FLSA 
amendments. Instead of a 40 hour work week, it adopted a 
seven day work period in which an officer could be required to 
work 43 hours before overtime compensation was required. 
Negotiations between Ogden and its police officers 
continued during the following 4 years in order to establish 
a comp-time policy. In 1989, employees of the Ogden Police 
Department sought to utilize these three hours referred to as 
"GAP time" towards their retirement. These negotiations 
ultimately resulted in an agreement to provide "GAP time" 
alternatives. Employees were given the choice of electing 
comp time or being paid at regular time and having the pay 
count towards their retirement benefits. Those who elected 
the latter would have their contribution withheld and the 
employer's contribution would be added and sent to the 
Retirement System. This process went into effect in April of 
1990. They have negotiated for their own mutual benefit. The 
City has not exceeded its authority. The Retirement System 
should not be able to interfere with these negotiations. 
CONCLUSION 
The AHO's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law should 
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be reversed. The meaning of the term "overtime" found in Utah 
Code Ann. §49-4-103 (1) (c) should not include the GAP time 
these police officers are required to work without overtime 
compensation. The Utah Retirement System should be estopped 
from refusing to include contributions based upon "GAP time" 
hours worked since it was aware of the detrimental reliance 
its acceptance of these contributions had upon O'Keefe and 
similarly affected members. The system should not interfere 
with the contractual negotiations of the City and its 
employees so long as the actuarial soundness of the plan is 
maintained. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 7 ^ day of January, 1996. 
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
R. FLORENCE 
Attorney for Appellant 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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Dear Mr. Florence: 
Regarding your letter of July 1, 1994 concerning gap time for Ogden City police officers. 
The Board has always administered the statute governing the public safety employees 
retirement plan with a full-time basis. Full-time being 40 hours per week. All overtime beyond 40 
hours was and is ineligible for compensation definitions or inclusion in computing the final 
average salary figure. 
If you do not agree, you may appeal to our Adjudicative Hearing Officer, Mr. James L. 
Barker. The materials needed for the appeals process are enclosed. 
Sincerely, 
UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 
? 
MDW:sbc 
M. Dee Williams 
Executive Director 
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BUCK FROERER 
Attorney for Ogden City 
2484 Washington Blvd., #320 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
JOSEPH W. O'KEEFE, JR., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Respondent 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT 
BY PETITIONER AND 
RESPONDENT 
Joseph W. O'Keefe, Jr, Petitioner, the Utah State Retirement Board, Respondent, and Ogden 
City, Third Party Intervenor, pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-9, by and through counsel hereby stipulate and agree to the following background and facts: 
BACKflROTJND 
This case arises out of a disagreement between Joe O'Keefe, Petitioner, and others similarly 
situated, who are police officers employed by Ogden City and the Utah Retirement Systems 
("URS"), over the refusal of URS to accept retirement contributions on "GAP" time - i.e. a three 
1 
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(3) hour period worked by Petitioner over and above the regular 40 hour pay period. The URS 
position is that this additional time worked is "overtime" and is excluded from coverage under Utah 
law. The Petitioner's position is that this time should be treated as regular time and URS should be 
ordered to accept the contributions paid since 1990 and include "GAP" time in the final average 
salary component used to calculate Petitioner's retirement allowance. Both sides agree that if the 
decision of the Hearing Officer is in favor of Petitioner, the decision will be applied both 
prospectively and retroactively to cover contributions paid on behalf of Petitioner and others 
similarly situated since 1990. 
The following Stipulation of Facts is intended to serve as the sole factual basis for the 
determination in this case. Accompanying memoranda of law will be supplied in accordance with 
the schedule established by the Hearing Officer. 
STTPTTTATTON OF FACTS 
1. Petitioner, Joe O'Keefe and other peace officers similarly situated are public safety 
employees employed by Ogden City, and have been for the entire period of this controversy. 
2. On July 1, 1985, Ogden City initiated a program whereby its peace officers, under certain 
prescribed and agreed upon circumstances, could be required to work more than 40 hours per week. 
3. In 1989, as a result of negotiations held between Ogden City and its employees, including 
Petitioner, an agreement was reached whereby any hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week but 
not more than 43 hours per week could be treated in either of two ways: 
a.) The three (3) hours in question (commonly referred to as "GAP" time) could be taken 
later as leave, pursuant to which no compensation would be paid; or 
b.) The "GAP" time could be treated as regular compensation (paid at regular - not 
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overtime rates), pursuant to which the officer would receive additional compensation on 
which retirement contributions would be paid. 
4. The effect of the additional compensation and retirement contributions in the final three (3) 
years of Petitioner's employment would result in an increase in the monthly retirement allowance 
of Petitioner - estimated as follows: 
A. Assuming a May 1,1995 retirement date: 
If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the additional 
compensation is used in the calculation of the retirement allowance , the benefit 
would be $1,819.68. 
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time and the additional 
compensation is not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit 
would be $1,697.34. 
B. Assuming a July 1,1995 retirement date: 
If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the additional 
compensation is used in the calculation of the retirement allowance , the benefit 
would be $1,842.48. 
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time and the additional 
compensation is not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit 
would be $1,717.80. 
Thus, Petitioner's retirement allowance, if GAP time is determined to be eligible time 
worked under Utah laws, would increase anywhere between $122.34 - $124.68 per month. 
5. In 1990, Ogden City began sending the first employer and employee contributions to the 
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retirement systems for those employees who chose to treat the 3 hour additional time (GAP) worked 
as "regular compensation." URS received and credited these contributions to the appropriate 
participating members' accounts, including Petitioner. 
6. In 1991, due to an administrative oversight, no contributions were sent by Ogden City. In 
1992, Ogden City forwarded the required contributions for both 1991 and 1992. 
7. Upon receipt of the 1992 contributions, URS determined that the GAP time contributions 
were ineligible and refunded the GAP time contributions to Ogden City for the appropriate years. 
8. During the period from 1992 to the present, Petitioner has taken the position that both the 
original 1990 contributions and subsequent contributions were eligible and should not have been 
refunded. URS has taken the position that the office ruled the contributions ineligible as soon as it 
had actual knowledge of the GAP time issues. Actual knowledge did not occur until^an employee 
sought to retire with GAP time included as part of compensation. 
9. During this same period, officials from URS, Ogden City, Petitioner, and others similarly 
situated met in an attempt to resolve the different interpretations of the law. During these 
discussions the retirement office agreed to resume its acceptance of Gap time contributions^while J 
A J additional study took place on the feasibility of developing a permanent policy covering Gap time 
contributions. Pe^Tio**^. W n ^ W A ^>£fc*\Awe**T~ ^oVscu WaO GEgvO A O o ^ C 
10. Also during this time another employing unit, Weber County, requested Gap time coverage. 
All the parties then agreed that the board's actuary, Wyatt and Associates, should determine any 
actuarial impact which would result from including GAP time in "compensation" for retirement 
purposes. 
11. The actuary's assumptions and response was delivered in a letter to M. Dee Williams, 
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Executive Director of URS, on June 2, 1994: 
"As explained to us, Ogden police officers have a 43-hour work week. 
However, officers are allowed a choice between (i) taking direct pay for the three 
hours over 40, or (ii) taking this time as additional comp time. Most officers take the 
time as comp time, but as they approach retirement, officers can and do switch to 
taking this as pay. By doing so, they increase their Average Annual Compensation, 
resulting in a higher retirement benefit. 
This policy increases the employer's contribution rate from 9.8% to 11.7%. 
Our calculation assumes that all members elect to maximize their retirement benefit -
i.e., they will be able to plan well enough in advance to increase their retirement 
benefits by 7.5% (the ratio of the 3 extra hours to the 40 hours they were being paid 
for earlier)." 
12. As a result of the actuary's findings and conclusions, URS resolved to permanently deny 
GAP time contributions. An additional reason for denial was forwarded - any administrative, i.e. 
URS decision to include GAP time would indeed be adding a benefit to the existing system at the 
cost determined by the actuary. Such an added benefit with a potential cost to all employers and 
employees, not just to Ogden City and its employees, should be decided by the Legislature, not URS. 
13. Petitioner has brought to URS' attention that a small number of Ogden Public Safety officers 
actually received a retirement allowance with Gap time included. The retirement office has agreed 
to honor those retirements. 
14. These are twenty two (22) Ogden police officers left in this dispute. Ten (10) officers have 
elected to take their Gap time contribution refunds and are excluded from this dispute. 
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These facts constitute the entire background and facts upon which Petitioner and Respondent 
seek an adjudication- All parties are prepared and desire to submit memoranda of law in support of 
their respective positions, including Ogden City, which will be in accordance with the following 
schedule: 
Petitioner's Brief - 30 days from the filing of the Stipulation of Facts with the Hearing 
Officer. 
Respondent's Brief - 30 days from the receipt of Petitioner's Brief. 
Third Party Intervenors Brief - 30 days from the receipt of Petitioner's Brief. 
Petitioner's Reply Brief - 10 days from the receipt of Respondent's and Third Party 
Intervenor's Briefs, whichever is later. 
Agreed to this 3Iyr~ day of March, 1995. 
f ^ l w - A cffL^ cWTA 
Brian Florence Kevin A. Howard 
Attorney for Petitioner Attorney for Respondent 
J&MLI&IA 
Buck Froerer 
Attorney for Ogden City 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
JOSEPH W. O'KEEFE, JR., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Respondent. 
Based upon the evidence received at the evidentiary hearing in this matter and the legal 
memoranda submitted by both parties, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer makes the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner, Joe O'Keefe and other peace officers similarly situated are public safety 
employees employed by Ogden City, and have been for the entire period of this controversy. 
2. On July 1,1985, Ogden City initiated a program whereby its peace officers, under 
certain prescribed and agreed upon circumstances, could be required to work more than 40 hours per 
week. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER TO DISMISS 
1 [Kevin/Okeefe.ord] 
3. In 1989, as a result of negotiations held between Ogden City and its employees, 
including Petitioner, an agreement was reached whereby any hours worked in excess of 40 hours per 
week but not more than 43 hours per week could be treated in either of two ways: 
A. The three (3) hours in question (commonly referred to as "Gap" time) could 
be taken later as leave, pursuant to which no compensation would be paid; or 
B. The "Gap" time could be treated as regular compensation (paid at regular -
not overtime rates), pursuant to which the officer would receive additional compensation on 
which retirement contributions would be paid. 
4. The effect of the additional compensation and retirement contributions in the final 
three (3) years of Petitioner's employment would result in an increase in the monthly retirement 
allowance of Petitioner - estimated as follows: 
A. Assuming a May 1,1995, retirement date: 
If the URS accepts contributions on "Gap" time and the additional 
compensation is used in the calculation of the retirement allowance , the benefit 
would be $1,819.68. 
If the URS does not accept contributions on "Gap" time and the additional 
compensation is not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit 
would be $1,697.34. 
B. Assuming a July 1,1995, retirement date: 
If the URS accepts contributions on "Gap" time and the additional 
compensation is used in the calculation of the retirement allowance, the benefit 
would be $1,842.48. 
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If the URS does wi accept contributions on "Gap" time and the additional 
compensation is not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit 
would be $1,717.80. 
Thus, Petitioner's retirement allowance, if "Gap" time is determined to be eligible time 
worked under Utah laws, would increase anywhere between $122.34 - $124.68 per month. 
5. In 1990, Ogden City began sending the first employer and employee contributions 
to the retirement systems for those employees who chose to treat the 3 hour additional time ("Gap") 
worked as "regular compensation." URS received and credited these contributions to the appropriate 
participating members' accounts, including Petitioner. 
6. In 1991, due to an administrative oversight, no contributions were sent by Ogden 
City. In 1992, Ogden City forwarded the required contributions for both 1991 and 1992. 
7. Upon receipt of the 1992 contributions, URS determined that the "Gap" time 
contributions were ineligible and refunded the "Gap" time contributions to Ogden City for the 
appropriate years. 
8. During the period from 1992 to the present, Petitioner has taken the position that both 
the original 1990 contributions and subsequent contributions were eligible and should not have been 
refunded. URS has taken the position that the Retirement Office ruled the contributions ineligible 
as soon as it had actual knowledge of the "Gap" time issues. Actual knowledge did not occur until 
some time in 1992 when an employee sought to retire with "Gap" time included as part of 
compensation. 
9. During this same period, officials from URS, Ogden City, Petitioner, and others 
similarly situated met in an attempt to resolve the different interpretations of the law. During these 
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discussions the Retirement Office agreed to resume its acceptance of "Gap" time contributions 
conditionally while an additional study took place on the feasibility of developing a permanent 
policy covering "Gap" time contributions. Petitioner believed a permanent policy had been adopted 
and the contributions were being accepted unconditionally. 
10. Also during this time another employing unit, Weber County, requested "Gap" time 
coverage. All the parties then agreed that the Board's actuary, Wyatt and Associates, should 
determine any actuarial impact which would result from including "Gap" time in "compensation" 
for retirement purposes. 
11. The actuary's assumptions and response was delivered in a letter to M. Dee Williams, 
Executive Director of URS, on June 2, 1994: 
As explained to us, Ogden police officers have a 43-hour work week. 
However, officers are allowed a choice between (I) taking direct pay for the three 
hours over 40, or (ii) taking this time as additional comp time. Most officers take the 
time as comp time, but as they approach retirement, officers can and do switch to 
taking this as pay. By doing so, they increase their Average Annual Compensation, 
resulting in a higher retirement benefit. 
This policy increases the employer's contribution rate from 9.8% to 11.7%. 
Our calculation assumes that all members elect to maximize their retirement benefit -
i.e., they will be able to plan well enough in advance to increase their retirement 
benefits by 7.5% (the ratio of the 3 extra hours to the 40 hours they were being paid 
for earlier). 
12. As a result of the actuary's findings and conclusions, URS resolved to permanently 
deny "Gap" time contributions. An additional reason for denial was forwarded - any administrative, 
i.e. URS decision to include "Gap" time would indeed be adding a benefit to the existing system at 
the cost determined by the actuary. Such an added benefit with a potential cost to all employers and 
employees, not just to Ogden City and its employees, should be decided by the legislature, not URS. 
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13. Petitioner has brought to URS' attention that a small number of Ogden Public Safety 
officers actually received a retirement allowance with "Gap" time included. The Retirement Office 
has agreed to honor those retirements. 
14. There are twenty two (22) Ogden police officers left in this dispute. Ten (10) officers 
have elected to take their "Gap" time contribution refunds and are excluded from this dispute. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner's appeal for inclusion of "Gap" time as compensation for retirement purposes and 
for the Board to accept contributions thereon is based on a number of theories - each of them will 
be discussed herein. 
1. Petitioner seeks a determination that federal law be used to define "overtime." 
Petitioner is certainly correct that "overtime compensation" is subject to federal law. The stipulated 
facts (No. 3) show that Petitioner and his employer, Ogden City, were aware of federal requirements 
when negotiating the treatment of "Gap" time. However, just because federal law is applicable to 
the treatment of "Gap" time between Petitioner and his employer does not mean that federal law 
governs the operation of Utah's statutory retirement systems. In fact, public pension plans are 
specifically exempt from the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") which 
controls pension activities in general. Petitioner has not demonstrated that federal law controls. The 
legislature is still free to establish what compensation is includable for retirement purposes. 
The more persuasive argument is that state law controls. Under state retirement statutes, 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(1)(c)(1) specifically excludes overtime. No definition of overtime 
appears under Title 49. However, Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(3) does provide that "full-time 
service means 2,080 hours per year." Petitioner claims that should only be interpreted to establish 
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a minimum requirement for membership. However, the definition itself carries no such limited 
application. The Board's interpretation does not appear to be unreasonable, especially when coupled 
with the actuary's conclusion that the adoption of Petitioner's position would result in a substantial 
increase both in benefits and in contribution rates for employers and/or employees. This appears to 
be within the Board's mandate "to maintain, in conjunction with participating employers and 
members, the systems, plans and programs on an actuarially sound or approved basis...." Utah 
Code Ann. § 49-1-203. 
Therefore, this court concludes that state law, not federal law applies to this matter. 
2. Petitioner's second major contention is that the Board's interpretation of overtime 
unreasonably interfered with an existing employment contract between Petitioner and his employer 
and restricted the member's right to contract for labor. No evidence exists on the record that the 
Board or its agents were in any way involved in the negotiation process between Petitioner and his 
employer. Indeed, the statutes governing compensation were in existence in 1989 at the time of 
these negotiations. Petitioner and his employer should have known this. The brief submitted by 
Ogden City appears to support the Board's position in this case. 
Therefore, this court concludes that the Board did not interfere with any contract right of 
Petitioner. 
3. The final argument forwarded by Petitioner is based on the doctrine of estoppel. That 
doctrine, as Petitioner properly states requires (1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by one 
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party 
taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the 
second party that would result from allowing the act, or failure to act. 
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Petitioner has not met his burden of proof for applying the doctrine. The stipulation states 
that he reasonably believed that a permanent policy had been adopted and that contributions were 
being accepted unconditionally. But, the stipulation also states that he was aware that the Board 
agreed to resume its acceptance of "Gap" time contributions only conditionally, and that on June 2, 
1994, prior to retiring, that the actuary had recommended raising the employer's contribution rate, 
and that the Board had resolved to deny the "Gap" contributions. Therefore, this court concludes 
Petitioner has not met the elements required to invoke the doctrine of estoppel. 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
Petitioner's request that the Board be required to accept "Gap" time contributions during the 
last four years is denied. 
Dated this /eZ day of October, 1995. 
James L. Barker, Jr. 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the Adjudicative 
Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board. 
DATED this /<$ day of October, 1995. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
fTt^' ' - 7 ^ 
